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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the extent of and causes of change 
in corporate focus in the 1980s. We find that most of the 
2,500 largest U.S. firms became more specialized in the 
1980s. The greatest change in focus took place through the 
exit of diversified firms which were replaced by smaller, 
less diversified, and more often private entrants. While 
most firms focused, the largest firms in the economy 
continued their historical trend towards greater diversifi-
cation during the 1980s. As a consequence, the fraction of 
assets and revenues in the economy controlled by highly 
diversified firms fell only slightly. While the results do 
not support most explanations for corporate refocusing, we 
find that firms with strong core market positions and high 
R & D expenditures tended to diversify while other firms 
refocused. This suggests that refocusing during the 1980s 
was primarily a response to changing competitive forces in 
the U.S. economy. 
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1. Introduction 
An important development in the 1980s was the apparent reversal of a historical trend of 
diversification as many firms divested lines of business, or were broken up following hostile 
takeovers and leveraged buyouts. I For this reason, corporate de-diversification (or "refocusing") 
has been widely cited as a key motive for the high volume of corporate restructming activity during 
the 1980s.2 Yet, this shift towards corporate refocusing in the 1980s remains a puzzle. Why 
should corporate behavior have changed so dramatically, reversing diversification decisions 
previously endorsed by shareholders? 3 This paper attempts to answer this question in two ways. 
First, we document the extent of corporate refocusing during the 1980s among firms in the U.S. 
economy and show how such changes depend on size, initial diversification, and whether a firm is 
public or private. Second, we test the principal explanations which have been given for corporate 
refocusing. These are: 
(i) Reduction of agency costs. Refocusing during the 1980s may have reversed prior acquisition. 
diversification and expansion decisions carried out by non-value-maximizing managers 
[Jensen (1986, 1991), Bicksler and Chen (1991)]. 
(ii) Reduction of internal capital market efficiency. Refocusing may have reduced the scope of 
firms' internal capital markets, as continuing innovation in fmancial markets and the 
reinvigorated market for corporate control during the 1980s reduced their advantage in 
allocating capital among lines of business relative to external cap4al markets [Bhide (1990)]. 
(iii) Response to antitrust relaxation. Relaxed antitrust enforcement in the 1980s may have 
increased the comparative value of horizontal market expansion relative to diversification, 
leading firms to expand core businesses and shed peripheral businesses with small market 
shares [Shleifer and Vishny (1991)]. 
(iv) Reduction of misvaluation. Refocusing may have been intended to reduce information 
asymmetries between shareholders and managers by simplifying the valuation problems of 
complex diversified firms and allowing hidden asset values to be realized [Stein (1989), 
LeBaron and Speidell (1987)]. 
These explanations rely on the benefits of refocusing. However, there are also costs of 
refocusing. For example, diversification may yield economies of scope in valuable fum-specific 
assets such as knowledge, reputation and proprietary technology which would be lost if 
1 For details see Bhagat. Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Hoskisson and Johnson (1991), Kaplan and Weisbacb {1992), 
Comment and Jarrell (1992), Lichtenberg (1992), and Liebeskind, Wiersema and Hansen (1992). 
2 See, for example, Jensen (1991), Shleifez and Visbny (1991), and Bbide (1990). 
3 Matsusaka {1990) shows that diversifying acquisitions during the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and 
1970s increased fmn value on avenge. 
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diversification is reversed [Teece (1980)]. Diversified fliiDS may also be able to allocate capital 
more efficiently than external capital markets [Williamson (1975)]. While the factors which 
influence the costs and benefits of diversification strategies have been extensively analyzed, little is 
known about the empirical determinants of change in corporate diversification.4 Diversification 
decisions, however, may be among the most important that managers make: the costs of mistaken 
diversification are high and can lead to increased risk of takeover [Mitchell and Lehn ( 1990), 
Neumark and Sharpe (1992), Opler (1992)]. 
Two previous studies have examined corporate refocusing in the 1980s using COMPUSTAT 
business segment data. Uchtenberg (1992) fmds that public firms reponed fewer 4-digit lines of 
business as the 1980s progressed; he also fmds that more focused fliiDS had higher total factor 
productivity. Comment and Jarrell (1992) also find that public firms became more specialized and 
reponed fewer 4-digit operating segments as the 1980s progressed. Their analysis proceeds to 
show that refocusing increased market value and that several sources of economies of scope often 
are not realized by diversified firms. 5 
Our analysis uses different data than these previous studies. This data was compiled from 
TRINET Inc.'s Large Establishment Database, a data source which is more detailed than the 
COMPUSTA T segment data, is less prone to self-reporting biases, and covers both public and 
private firms. The TRINET data therefore offers a more complete record of corporate refocusing 
among large firms during the 1980s. 
In addition, because diversification is a complex phenomenon, the extent of refocusing 
measured in different studies may depend on the measures used and the level of industry 
aggregation followed. We use the following four measures of diversification: (1) specialization 
4 Rumelt (1986. p. viii) comments: "'We still do not really understand what triggers changes in diversification 
strategy. Why do some finns diversify while others retrench in the face of adversity?" One study which examines 
changes in diversification is Hill and Hansen (1991). They find that diversification in pharmaceutical firms is 
detennined by market saturation in co-e businesses. di1Ierences in managezial incentives. and ownership structure. 
Another study by Gort. Grabowski and McGuckin (1985) shows that increases in diversification among 191 finns 
in the 1%7-71 period were negatively relaled to prior diversiflCation and to productivity growth in the finn's core 
industy. 
5 Lang and Stulz (1992) also study the relation between focus and market value in the 1980s. They find a 
U-shaped relation between diversification and Tobin's q. 
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(the fraction of a firm's total employees in its largest 4-d.igit SIC code, also called the "maximum 
proportion"); (2) relatedness (the fraction of a firm's total employees in its largest 2-digit SIC 
code); (3) 4-digit span (the number of 4-digit SIC code industries in which the firm is active); and 
( 4) 2-digit span. 6 We find that both specialization and relatedness increased among the largest 
U.S. fums during the 1980s, but that 4-digit span increased Therefore, the representative large 
firm in the U.S. economy generated more sales in its core business areas in 1989 than in 1981, but 
entered more lines of business. We also find that the very largest fums in the economy became 
less specialized in the 1980s, continuing their trend of increasing diversification documented by 
Gort (1962), Rumelt (1986) and Spruill (1982). 
We fmd little support for any of the four explanations for corporate refocusing examined. 
First, we find that Tobin's q is an insignificant predictor of change in corporate focus in the 1980s. 
This fmding is inconsistent with the agency cost explanation for corporate refocusing which 
predicts that poorly performing fums (those with low q's) will be the most likely to refocus. 
However, we find a strong trend of mean reversion in diversification during the 1980s, showing 
that more highly diversified firms refocused the most during the 1980s, regardless of their 
performance. Second, we find no evidence to support the internal capital market inefficiency 
explanation for corporate refocusing: the largest fums in the economy continued to expand and 
diversify during the 1980s. Third, we fmd little support for the argument that changes in focus 
during the 1980s were a result of relaxed antitrust policy. Firms with the highest core business 
market shares in 1981 continued to diversify dming the 1980s, despite new opporn.mities to 
increase their core business market shares through horizontal acquisitions. Moreover, large firms 
were most active in adding businesses to periphery rather than core business areas. Finally, we 
find no evidence that misvaluation influenced refocusing. Firms which had high levels of analyst 
forecast disagreement in 1980 were less likely, not more likely, to refocus. 
6 These measures are based on Rumelt's (1986) classification of corporate strategies and are used widely in research 
on diversification. See, for example, Hill and Snell (1988) and Comment and Jarrell (1992). In an earlier version 
of the paper we also examined changes in the Entropy and Herfindahl measures of corporate focus but found that our 
results did not change with these measures. This is not surprising since these measures were highly correlated with 
the specialization and relatedness ratios used here. 
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Of course, our conclusions are only as strong as the proxies for the theories we test It is 
possible that other proxy variables may provide more suppon for one or more of these 
explanations for refocusing. This proviso notwithstanding, our findings suggest that corporate 
refocusing during the 1980s was a response to changes in the competitive environment First, we 
find that firms with smaller core business market shares in 1981 refocused more than firms with 
larger core market shares. Second, we find that firms with high levels of R&D expenditure were 
more likely to diversify, suggesting that firms which owned valuable idiosyncratic assets were not 
subject to pressures to refocus. Overall, therefore, we find that large firms with large core market 
shares and high R&D levels expanded and diversified, while smaller firms with small core market 
positions and few idiosyncratic assets retrenched. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
arguments regarding the benefits and costs of corporate focus in order to establish hypotheses to 
explain cross-sectional variation in refocusing in the 1980s. Section 3 describes the data and 
measures of focus . used in this study. Section 4 documents the extent of corporate refocusing 
among the largest 2,500 firms in the U.S. economy during the 1980s. Section 5 presents 
longitudinal regression analyses of the determinants of corporate refocusing in public firms. 
Section 6 summarizes and discusses the results. 
2. The Benefits and Costs of Corporate Refocusing 
2.1 Benefits of Refocusing 
Four explanations have been provided for the corporate refocusing phenomenon which point 
to the value created by reducing the costs of diversification. These explanations are: 
(i) Reduction of agency costs. Poor incentive structures may cause managers in public 
corporations to over-invest in diverSifying expansion, reducing the value of the firm. [See, for 
example, Marris (1964), Amihud and Lev (1981), Jensen (1986)]. Managerially-motivated 
diversification may reduce finn value by permitting managers to cross-subsidize unprofitable lines 
of business [Bhide (1990)]. Managers may also overpay for takeover targets [Roll (1986), Morek, 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1990)]. Refocusing may have increased during the 1980s, and not before, as 
the extent of the extent of agency costs associated with diversification was revealed. Pressure to 
refocus may also have intensified during the 1980s because the rise in real interest rates increased 
the costs of cross-subsidization, and because financial innovations reduced the costs of launching a 
hostile takeover? The agency theory explanation for refocusing suggests that private corporations~ 
where managers typically own more equity, should be less likely to have undertaken wasteful 
diversification in the 1960s and 1970s than managers in public firms (Jensen 1991). 
Consequently, privately held firms should have had less need to refocus during the 1980s than 
public firms. We investigate this issue in Section 4. The agency explanation of refocusing also 
predicts that firms which have a low Tobin's q should refocus since low Tobin's q signifies low 
expected cash flows relative to invested assets, an indicator of poor expected finn performance and 
agency conflict [see Lang and Litzenberger (1989)]. We investigate this issue in Section 5. 
(ii) Reduction of internal capital market inefficiency. A second explanation for refocusing is 
that external governance of capital allocation among lines of business became more efficient relative 
to internal capital market governance in the 1980s. First, increasing shareholder activism and 
changes in legal precedent regarding shareholders' rights may have increased the efficiency of 
governance of capital allocation decisions by shareholders relative to corporate headquarters [Bhide 
(1990), Jensen (1991)]. Second, innovations in external fmancial markets (e.g. the venture capital 
market) may have made market governance of some capital reallocation decisions more efficient. 
Both of these considerations suggest that breaking up internal capital markets may have created 
value during the 1980s. In Section 4 we test this explanation for refocusing by examining change 
in the scope of internal capital markets (measured in terms of revenues) of more focused firms 
during the 1980s. In Section 5 we analyze the relationship between corporate refocusing and firm 
fixed assets in 1981. According to the internal capital market inefficiency explanation for 
refocusing, firms with greater fixed asset bases should be more liable to refocus than other firms 
7 Comment and Jarrell (1992) present a related story that refocusing was the result of reduced retmns from 
holding assets for future sale attributable to an active market for corp<nte assets. 
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since they have historically higher levels of capital investment with the resulting potential for capital 
misallocation. 
(iii) Relaxation of antitrust el(orcement. During the 1980s, the enforcement of anti-trust 
legislation was relaxed, giving many firms with large market shares a new option to undertake 
horizontal market expansion through merger [Shleifer and Vishny (1991)]. Consequently, some 
firms may have found it relatively more profitable to focus by expanding lines of business in which 
they held large market shares at the beginning of the decade than to diversify. We test this 
explanation by investigating whether firms with the highest core market shares in 1981 were more 
likely to refocus, since these firms should have had the most to gain from the relaxation of antitrust 
regulation. 
(iv) Reduction in market misvaluarion. Diversified firms may be more subject to misvaluation 
by the market than focused firms because of the difficulty of valuing synergies between lines of 
business. Evidence offered by LeBaron and Speidell (1987) is consistent with this claim. 
Misvaluation of diversified firms may have intensified shareholder pressure to refocus during the 
1980s. In Section 5 we test this explanation for refocusing using disagreement among analysts' 
earnings forecasts as a proxy for misvaluation. The less analysts agree over future finn 
performance, the less likely it is that the firm is being valued accurately and the greater pressure to 
·refocus. If equity market misvaluation were the primary cause of refocusing then we would also 
expect to see more focusing in public than in private firms. 
2.2 The Costs of Refocusing 
The four explanations outlined above suggest that refocusing will increase firm value because 
the costs of diversification outweigh its benefits. However, other arguments suggest that 
diversification in the 1980s may have brought significant benefits. We categorize these arguments 
into two groups: 
(i) Changing economies of scope. Diversified fmns may be able to exploit economies of 
scope in assets which are firm-specific by using them to produce a number of different products 
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[Teece (1980)]. These assets may be tangible, such as production and distribution facilities, or 
intangible, such as proprietary know-how or reputational capital. In either case, synergistic or 
"related" diversification should increase the value of the firm. Gort (1962), Hill and Hansen 
(1991) and others have shown that diversifying investment tends to be concentrated in technology-
intensive industries. The value of economies of scope may have during the 1980s due to increased 
technological innovation. It is also possible that product market globalization during the 1980s 
created new sources of economies of scope for diversified firms. ·we examine the role of 
economies of scope in Section 4 of this paper by investigating whether related diversification 
increased or decreased during the 1980s. In Section 5 we investigate whether idiosyncratic and 
extensible assets are associated with increases in diversification, using R&D expenditures as a 
proxy for such assets. 
(ii) Increases in internal capital market efficiency. Internal capital markets may be more 
efficient than external capital markets, despite their costs. Williamson (1975) argues that resource 
allocation is more efficient in internal capital markets because there is less information asymmetry 
between corporate headquarters and divisional managers than there is between shareholders and 
managers. Thus, we entertain the hypothesis that the relative efficiency of internal capital markets 
increased in the 1980s. This is the opposite of the relative capital market inefficiency hypothesis 
discussed earlier. Internal capital market efficiency may have increased in the 1980s as firms 
changed their procedures for making divisional investments or improved the accuracy of internal 
performance measurement In certain cases, organizational innovations may have reduced cross-
subsidization problems (e.g. legal "Chinese Walls" between divisions as in National Intergroup 
and USX).s 
8The 1980s also saw the rise of leveraged buyout specialist organizations such as Kohlbcrg, Kravis and 
Roberts which perfonned many of the functioos of the headquarters of a multi-divisional finn while 
disallowing cross-subsidization. 
3. Data, Sample and Measures 
3.1 Sample 
8 
Our base sample includes 3,609 public and private U.S. corporations which were among the 
2,500 largest employers 1981 and/or 1989. This sample consists of surviving, exiting and 
entering firms. Surviving fmns are defined as those which were independent legal entities in 1981 
(that is, not a subsidiary fum of another corporation nor in Chapter 11) and remained independent 
until 1989. Firms among the largest 2,500 independent employers in 1981 were also classified as 
surviving firms even if they were not among the top 2,500 in 1989. Firms which were 
independent in 1981 but which did not survive unti11989 are defined as exiting firms. Entering 
firms are defined as independent fmns which were not among the largest 2,500 employers in 
1981, but had become so by 1989. These firms may have existed in 1981, or been started up 
between 1981 and 1989. 
32Data 
Financial data for this study were collected from the COMPUSTAT PSI', Full Coverage and 
Research files. These data describe firm R&D, capital expenditures, operating income, sales, and 
asset base. We obtained data on analysts' earnings-forecast disagreement from the 1/BIE/S Inc. 
database. Data on firm diversification and industry market share are estimated from lRINET 
Inc.'s Large Establishment Database (hereafter referred to as TRINET). Details of these measures 
are given in Section 3.3 and Appendix A. TRINET provides information on establishments (i.e. 
plants, administrative offices or other separate geographic business locations) that employ 20 or 
more persons in United States. 1RINET classifies each establishment according to a primary four-
digit SIC code and provides information on the establishment's number of employees and 
estimated sales in cUITent dollars. Establishment-level data can be aggregated to the company level 
using parent company codes. 1RINET Inc. updates its database continually by direct surveys, 
telephone calls to establishments, and reference to corporate financial data and news items; new 
versions of the Large Establishment Database are issued on tape biannually for research purposes. 
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A particularly useful feature of TRINET is that it provides information on establishments owned by 
private firms as well as information on establishments owned by public firms; this allows us to 
compare changes in focus in public firms with changes in focus in similar private firms. 
The TRINET data have several advantages over the COMPUSTAT industry segment data 
used in some earlier studies. First, COMPUSTAT data on diversification are collected at the 
"industry segment" level by firms according to Rule 14 of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB 14). Each industry segment is then assigned one four-digit SIC code. This 
procedure tends to lump information from many different types of corporate activities together 
given that industry segments often comprise both diversified and vertically integrated activities in 
large firms. TRINET data are collected at the establishment level so that the activities of the firm 
are disaggregated in much greater detail. Second, there is no standardization in the assignment of 
four-digit SIC codes to industry segments by COMPUSTAT. The industry segment data in 
COMPUSTAT are reported by the managers of each firm, allowing them to conceal diversification 
by combining activities into one segment.9 In contrast, TRINET uses SIC codes assigned by the 
Bureau of the Census to operating establishments. Third, according toFASB 14 COMPUSTAT 
data are only reponed for industry segments that account for 10 percent or more of final sales. The 
effect of this ruling is to omit secondary and intermediate lines of business even though these may 
be important sources of corporate profits or losses [Singh and Chang (1992)]. Instead, all 
secondary and intermediate activities of a firm that are primary activities at the establishment level 
are reponed in TRINET. 
We do not wish to imply that TRINET data give a better account of corporate diversity in all 
respects; these data have several problems of their own. The most important of these is that 
TRINET covers only U.S. establishments which may cause underreporting of diversity for firms 
with large overseas operations. In addition, data on establishment-level sales are not always 
directly measurable (for example, an establishment may make only intrafirm sales). In this case, 
9 F ASB 14 reads "detennination of an enterprise's industry segments must depend to a considerable extent on the 
judgement of the management of the enterprise .... " 
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TRINET uses data on industry labor productivity to infer establishment-level sales. This means 
that individual establishment-level sales data are less reliable than employee data in the 1RINET 
database. We therefore use employee-weighted measures of diversification in our analyses. 
3.3 Measurement issues 
Definitions of financial variables used in our regressions are given in Appendix A. The 
measures of fmn focus used in our analysis are defined as follows: 
(i) Specialization ratio. The specialization ratio (also called the "maximum proportion") is 
defined as the number of employees in a firm's largest 4-d.igit SIC industry divided by its total 
employees. The specialization ratio therefore measures the degree to which a firm's business 
portfolio is dominated by a single "core" line of business. Managers of highly specialized fmns 
may have detailed knowledge about products and customers since they oversee fewer lines of 
business. 
(ii) Relatedness ratio. The relatedness ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of employees 
in a fum's largest 2-digit SIC industry sector to its total number of employees. If the relatedness 
ratio is high most lines of business lie within one industrial sector, increasing the potential for 
earning economies of scope [Rumelt (1986)]. On the other hand, if the relatedness ratio is low, the 
firm will be diversified into more "unrelated" business sectors, reducing the potential for exploiting 
economies of scope. Several studies have associated measures of relatedness and firm 
performance.lO 
(iii) 4-digit Span. 4-digit Span is the number of 4-digit SIC codes in which the firm owns 
establishments. As 4-digit span increases, the level of knowledge at the corporate headquarters 
where capital allocation decisions are made about each individual line of business may decline, so 
that firms with greater span may be.less efficiently managed. Firms with many lines of business 
10 Rumelt (1986) and Palepu (1985) show that the accounting returns of related-diversified 
firms are higher than those of unrelated-diversified firms. Similarly, Wernerfelt and 
Montgomery (1988) show that related-diversified firms have higher Tobin's q. In contrast, 
Lang and Stulz (1992) show that diversified firms have lower q's. 
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may have invested excessively in "exploratory" diversification at the expense of building core 
competitive capability [Singh and Chang (1992)].11 
(iv) 2-digit Span. 2-digit span measures the number of 2-digit industries the firm participates 
in. If a firm participates in many 2-digit industries, its potential for exploiting economies of scope 
will be lower.12 
4. Trends in Firm Focus During the 1980s 
4.1 Changes in the size and focus of large corporations 
Table 1 shows changes taking place in the base sample consisting of all surving, entering and 
exiting firms. The table shows that firms in this sample refocused in terms of both median 
specialization and median relatedness in the 1980s. The specialization ratio of the median firms 
increased by 10.6%. By 1989, 65.8% of the median firm's sales came from one 4-digit business-
compared with 59.6% in 1981. The relatedness ratio increased even more, by a median of 16.8% .. 
showing a significant decline in unrelated diversification. By 1989, 80.7% of the median firm's 
sales were within one 2-digit industry. In contrast, the 4-digit span of the median firm increased 
by 16.7%, although its 2-digit span was unchanged. 
The results Table 1 are largely consistent with Jensen's (1991) ccintention that corporate 
restructuring in the 1980s created a population of smaller, leaner and more often private firms. Not 
only did the median firm refocus significantly, but median employment also dropped by 23.8% 
(although sales increased by 14.2%). In addition, the proportion of private firms in the population 
increased from 27.8% in 1981 to 39.2% in 1989. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1991) describe the trend in corporate refocusing during the 1980s as 
"deconglomerization". Our results support their description. The increases in specializ.ation and 
relatedness show that firms became more centered on core businesses during the 1980s, indicating 
11 Comment and Jarrell (1992) and Lichtenberg (1992) find that public finns on the average reduced their 4-
digit span during the 1980s. 
12 Howevez. Matsusaka (1990) notes that this is not always the case: some combinations of 2-digit industries 
offer economies of scope while others do not. 
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a decline in conglomerate diversification strategies which are typified by a portfolio of large 
businesses with no core. Our findings are also consistent with Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) who 
find that firms divested in more unrelated than related lines of business during the 1980s. 
Moreover, although we rmd that the median rmn added one 4-digit line of business, the fact that 
specialization and relatedness also increased shows that this new line of business was related 
Therefore, our results suggest that while rmns refocused in the 1980s, they also sought new 
opportunities to exploit economies of scope. 
A relevant question is whether the changes in focus among large rmns shown in Table 1 were 
caused by changes in the population of large rmns, rather than by changes in the focus of 
surviving flnns. An answer to this question is provided in Table 2. This table shows that 1,906 
rmns which were in the top 2,500 rmns in 1981 were also in the top 2,500 firms in 1989, a 
survival rate of 76%. However, there was a clear difference in focus between those firms which 
exited our sample and those which entered The focus of the median exiting finn was no lower 
than that of surviving firms (the specialization ratio was somewhat higher, while the relatedness 
ratio was the same). In contras~ entering firms were far more focused than either exiting or 
surviving firms. This panly reflects the smaller size of entrants because size and focus are 
inversely related Indeed, Table 2 shows that exiting firms were similar to surviving firms in terms 
of sales and employees in 1981, while entering firms bad less sales and fewer employees. 
Table 2 shows that the proportion of exiting firms which were privately held corporations was 
34.6%, while the proportion of entering firms which were private was half again as high (55.8% ). 
Therefore, exit also played a role in increasing the importance of private firms in the population of 
large firms observed in Table 1. 
Despite the importance of exit in changing the focus of the population of large rmns during the 
1980s, Table 2 shows that significant changes in focus took place among surviving firms. 
Specialization in the median surviving finn increased 3.4% (compared with an increase of 10.6% 
in the population) and relatedness increased 10.3% (compared with an increase of 16.8% in the 
population). Both of these changes are statistically significant at the one percent level. Consistent 
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with this trend, 4-digit span increased more in surviving flrms than in the overall population, by 
33.3% (compared with an increase of 16.7% in the population). Therefore, focus on core 
businesses increased less in surviving firms, and expansion at the margin increased more, than in 
the overall population. These results show that the increased focus we flnd in Table 1 was not 
solely due to the disappearance of flrms pursuing conglomerate diversification strategies. 
In conclusion, the evidence presented in Table 2 shows that the pattern of deconglomerization 
observed in Table 1 was caused by two factors: (a) the disappearance of diversified flrms from the 
population which were usually replaced by smaller, more focused firms and (b) refocusing among 
surviving firms. Interestingly, this evidence shows that deconglomerization in the population of 
large firms was caused by more than the disappearance of conglomerates. Other forces were at 
work pressuring surviving firms to refocus on core businesses. The rest of this paper is devoted 
to examining the possible causes of this phenomenon. 
4 2 Firm size and refocusing in surviving firms 
One factor which may have caused refocusing in surviving firms during the 1980s is over-
expansion. Large firms, with their giant bureaucracies, may be too large to diversify efficiently by 
exploiting synergies while containing agency costs. We examine the relationship between firm size 
and refocusing among surviving firms in Figure 1. This figure shows changes in specialization 
and relatedness by size decile (the largest firms have the lowest decile number). Swprisingly, the 
greatest increases in specialization and relatedness during the 1980s took place in relatively small 
firms. Specialization among the largest 190 firms in the sample actually decreased. 
One explanation for the tendency of the largest firms to diversify in the 1980s may be that they 
were sheltered from market discipline by their sheer size. The costs of takeover or other 
disciplinary mechanisms may have been too high to credibly threaten managers in very large firms 
with replacement if they did not perform. However, the development of the junk bond changed 
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this situation: the 1980s saw both abe largest buyouts and the largest takeovers ever undertaken.13 
This suggests that factors other than agency costs should explain this trend of continued 
diversification among large firms. One alternative explanation is that large firms are good 
diversifiers. For example, large firms may have greater stocks of fum-specific capital and so be 
able to generate greater economies of scope. 
Table 3 gives a more detailed view of portfolio restructuring activity by size decile, in order to 
account for the lower rates of refocusing among large firms. The first two columns of the table 
show the rates at which firms added establishments to their related core businesses (measured as 
the largest 2-digit SIC business of the firm) and to their unrelated periphery (non-core businesses). 
The largest firms had the lowest core business addition rates and the highest peripheral business 
addition rates. Differences in establishment addition rates between the largest and smallest firms 
are substantial. The median rate of addition to related core businesses among the largest firms 
(10.3%) is 38% lower than that among flim.S in the smallest size decile (16.7%). Similarly, the 
rate of addition to peripheral businesses among the largest flim.S (43.8%) is 89% higher than 
among the smallest firms (23.1%). Remarkably, the largest surviving firms almost doubled their 
number of establishments in peripheral businesses during the 1980s. Table 3 also shows that 
divestiture rates are generally lower than addition rates. Small firms divested more from core 
businesses areas than did large firms but did not divest peripheral assets at a substantially different 
rate. In all, the evidence presented in Table 3 suggests that the key factor underlying the 
differential refocusing of small and large firms in the 1980s was the asset investment rate and not 
the asset divestiture rate: larger firms invested more in peripheral businesses while small firms 
invested more in core businesses. 
l3 Such as the buyout of RJR-Nabisco, the takeovt"l' of General Foods by Philip Morris and the takeover of Getty 
Oil by Texaco. 
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43 Firm focus and refocusing in surviving firms 
A second factor which may have caused refocusing in surviving firms during the 1980s is 
over-diversification. Some firms may have become too diversified to efficiently exploit economies 
of scope or information asymmetries, or to avoid agency costs, capital misallocation, and 
misvaluation [Jensen (1986), Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Markides (1992)]. On the 
other hand, widely diversified firms may own valuable assets which can be exploited in a variety 
of markets. We investigate this issue in Figure 2 which shows changes in specialization and 
relatedness between 1981 and 1989 by firm focus decile in 1981. The figure shows clearly that 
firms which were highly diversified in 1981 refocused during the 1980s, while more focused firms 
diversified, indicating an overall trend of mean reversion in diversification. Mean-reversion is 
consistent with a number of explanations for refocusing. Highly diversified firms may have 
refocused to reduce agency costs, to reduce the scope of internal capital markets, to concentrate on 
horizontal expansion in core markets, or to overcome misvaluation. 
Figure 3 investigates whether or not refocusing has reduced the overall importance of the 
internal capital markets of highly diversified firms in the economy. The figure shows the 
proportion of aggregate revenues of all surviving public firms in both 1981 and 1989 which was 
earned by firms which had above median focus in 1981. According to· the internal capital market 
inefficiency argument the aggregate revenue share of firms which were more diversified in 1981 
should have decreased relative to the aggregate revenue share of more focused firms. The figure 
shows that the aggregate revenue shares of more specialized fllllls did increase between 1981 and 
1989, but only by 0.8%; the revenue shares of more related firms increased ·by 3%. Therefore, the 
aggregate scope of the internal capital markets of more focused firms increased only very slightly 
during the 1980s. In light of these results, it would be difficult to argue that refocusing can be 
largely understood as the result of increased inefficiency of internal capital market allocation. 
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4.4 Differences in refocusing in public and private finns 
According to the agency theory explanation for corporate refocusing, managerial incentive 
alignment with shareholders is weakest in public firms where managers typically own little equity 
relative to private fmns. Consequently, private firms should have had lower levels of inefficient 
diversification in 1981, giving them less reason to refocus. However, Table 4 shows that more 
refocusing took place among private firms than among public firms during the 1980s. 
Specialization increased by 10.2% in private firms and by only 0.4% in public firms; relatedness 
also increased more in private firms. These results appear to be inconsistent with agency 
arguments for refocusing. However, since private fli'IllS were smaller and more focused than 
public firms in 1981, it is possible that other factors led private flfDls to refocus more during the 
1980s. For example, private firms may have held weaker market positions than public fli'IllS in 
1981, and so may have been forced to exit more markets. Consistent with agency theory 
arguments, Table 4 shows that refocusing was higher in fli'IllS which changed from public to 
private ownership than in firms which remained public. 
With regard to changes in focus among surviving public firms, Table 4 shows that the 
specialization ratio remained essentially unchanged, but that the relatedness ratio increased 
significantly, by 7%. In contrast, 4-digit span increased by 25% in stlrViving public flfDlS between 
1981 and 1989. This latter finding is inconsistent with the findings of Lichtenberg (1992) and 
Comment and Jarrell (1991) who find that the 4-digit span of public firms declined during the 
1980s. One potential explanation for this difference in results is that both Lichtenberg and 
Comment and Jarrell use the COMPUSTAT industry segment data to measure span, which is 
collected at a higher level of aggregation than the TRINET data, and so ignores smaller lines of 
business. In fact, we see no increase in span at the 2-digit SIC level. Some of the previously 
discussed differences between the COMPUSTAT and Trinet databases may explain the difference 
in results. 
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S The Determinants of Change in Corporate Focus 
Regressions analyzing the determinants of change in corporate focus during the 1980s are 
shown in Tables 5 and 6. The sample of 1,215 fl.IlllS analyzed in these regression represents all 
surviving public fums from the largest 2,500 firms in 1981.14 Entering and exiting flrms are 
excluded as are private fums and firms which changed their corporate status from private to public 
or vice-versa between 1981 and 1989. The explanatory variables in the regressions are intended to 
test each of the four explanations for corporate refocusing which are discussed in detail in Section 
2.1. However, some caution is advised in interpreting these analyses: Since we lack a fully 
specified model of the causes of corporate diversification [Rumelt (1986)], the results can only be 
interpreted as part of a more comprehensive but unspecified causal model of the determinants of 
refocusing. 
Three models are presented for each of the four dependent variables considered below. To 
control for possible non-linearity in the relationships between independent and dependent 
variables, we use reduced rank regressions in the analyses [lman and Conover (1979)). This 
technique uses the ranks of dependent and all ordinal independent variables in an OLS regression. 
An important advantage of this regression method is that it is robust in the presence of the large 
outliers which naturally arise when measuring the percentage change in focus over a decade.15 
5.1 The determinants of increases in specialization and relatedness 
Table 5 shows the six regressions analyzing the determinants of increases in specialization and 
relatedness. The level of fum focus in 1981 is entered in all equations as a control variable since 
all explanations for refocusing in the 1980s which we test are conditioned on the prior extent of 
corporate diversiflcation. This coefficient of this variable is negative and significant in all the 
regressions, showing a trend of mean-reversion of diversification, consistent with the prior 
univariate analysis. Gort, Grabowski and McGuckin (1985) also find a trend in mean reversion in 
14 With the exception of 20 public finns listed in TRINET for which COMPUSTAT data wm: not available. 
15 The distribution of measures of growth in focus are skewed and highly leptokurtotic. 
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diversification in their sample of 191 firms examined in the 1967-71 period, showing that mean-
reversion in diversification was not confined to the 1980s. 
The agency explanation foe COipOnlte refocusing is tested using Tobin's q in 1981: firms with 
low Tobin's q are expected to refocus more than other firms. To our surprise, the regressions 
show no significant relationship between Tobin's q in 1981 and subsequent corporate 
refocusing.t6 This casts doubt on the argument that refocusing took place to reduce agency 
costs.17 
The internal capital market inefficiency explanation for refocusing is tested by relating the 
book value of a firm's assets in 1981 to subsequent refocusing using the logic that firms with high 
historical investment rates are more vulnerable to problems of capital misallocation [Bhide (1990)]. 
The regressions show a significant and economically important negative relationship between asset 
size in 1981 and refocusing; large firms were less likely to refocus than smaller firms. This is 
consistent with the prior univariate analysis of the relationship between firm size and refocusing 
reported in Figure 1. The finding is inconsistent with the internal capital market inefficiency 
explanation for refocusing. 
The antitrust argument for corporate refocusing is tested using core business market share in 
1981 as a proxy for the potential gains available to firms from the relaxation in enforcement of anti-
trust legislation during the 1980s. The regression results show a significant negative relationship 
between core business market share in 1981 and subsequent refocusing-a result inconsistent with 
the argument that firms previously constrained from horizontal market expansion in their core 
business focused most in the 1980s. To the contrary, firms with large market shares were less 
likely to refocus during the 1980s than firms with smaller shares. One explanation may be that the 
firms with higher core market shares had such a high share that even the relaxation of antitrust 
regulation would not enable them to expand these businesses any further. We examine this 
16 In an unreponed regression we also find that anothez measure ofpezfoonance, profitability in 1981, does 
not predict the extent of refocusing in lbe 1980s. 
17 Intemctions of q with cash flow and pi<r divezsificatioo as in Lang, Stolz and Walkling (1991) and 
Opler and Tiunan (1992) were also not statistically significant in unreported regressions. 
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possibility in the Model ll regressions which include a dummy variable for those firms with the 
highest quartile core business market shares in 1981. This variable is not important in either 
regression. Overall, these results suggest that firms with high core market shares in 1981 
possessed valuable assets that they exploited by increased diversification, and not by refocusing 
through core market expansion. Moreover, the results suggest that firms with smaller market 
shares retrenched by refocusing, rather than escaping from undesirable core market positions 
through diversification. This implies that firms which failed to build assets which conferred them a 
competitive advantage in their core markets were most under pressure to refocus in the 1980s. 
The misvaluation explanation for refocusing is tested using the variance of analysts' 
earnings forecasts in 1981. The results for this variable are reported separately in regression 
Model m, since data for this variable were available for only 771 of the total sample of 1,215 
firms. The results show that this variable is not significantly correlated with increases in 
specialization, and is negatively correlated with increases in relatedness. 
We test the economies of scope explanation for diversification using the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to total sales in 1981 as a proxy for the level of firm-specific assets. R&D 
expenditures are significantly negatively correlated with increases in focus in all the 
·. 
regressions. This result is consistent with our earlier conjecture that fmns with valuable 
idiosyncratic assets were not subjected to pressures to refocus in the 1980s. It is also 
consistent with the prior findings ofGort (1962) that diversification is concentrated in 
technology-intensive industries. 
52 The deteT"/1Unants of increases in span 
Table 6 repeats the analyses presented in Table 5 using growth in 4-digit and 2-digit span 
as dependent variables. Recall that increases in firm span represent increases in diversification, 
not increases in focus. The evidence we presented in Section 4 showed that 4-digit span 
increased among sample firms in the 1980s. Table 6 shows that lack of agency costs was a 
factor in this expansion. Tobin's q is positively correlated with increases in span, indicating 
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that firms which had low agency costs in 1981 entered more new businesses during the 1980s. 
Because change in span is highly correlated with asset growth, this coefficient may also reflect 
the market's ability to anticipate future growth of high q fums. Consistent with the results 
presented in Table 5, the regressions in also show that larger firms also increased their span 
more in the 1980s, as did more focused firms. Finally, the regressions in Table 6 show that 
firms with higher core market shares in 1981 diversified more than other firms, also consistent 
with the findings presented in Table 5. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper has studied the extent of change in corporate focus in the 1980s among the 
largest firms in the U.S. economy and has examined some of its possible causes. The median 
surviving fmn in our sample refocused by becoming more specialized and more related in the 
1980s. However, at the same time, involvement in related lines of business increased, 
suggesting that fmns continued to search for economies of scope in the 1980s. 
The results of this study give little suppon to any of the four explanations for refocusing 
investigated. In a test of the agency explanation for corporate refocusing, we find that Tobin's 
q was not a determinant of refocusing during the 1980s. We also fmd that refocusing was 
more extensive among private firms than public firms, suggesting weak managerial incentives 
in public fmns were not a predominant cause of subsequent pressures to refocus. This finding 
is also inconsistent with the story that equity market misvaluation led firms to focus. Other 
tests cast considerable doubt on the misvaluation, antitrust and internal capital market 
inefficiency explanations for corporate refocusing. 
Overall, the results of this study suggest that changes in corporate focus among surviving 
firms were a response to changes in the competitive environmenL First, we find that the largest 
firms in the economy diversified during the 1980s, while smaller firms refocused. This suggests 
that large firms benefitted from economies of scope (such as cost advantages in joint production) 
not available to smaller firms. Such advantages may have become an important condition for 
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successful diversification in the 1980s as global competition intensified. Second, we find that 
firms with high levels of investment in R&D diversified during the 1980s. This is consistent with 
arguments that R&D investments are an importnat source of competitive advantage--especially in 
global markets [Kravis and Lipsey (1992)]. Finally, we find that firms with higher core market 
shares diversified during the 1980s. High core market share may indicate that firms possess cost 
or product advantages not available to rivals which can then be transferred to other markets. Once 
again, these advantages may have become a condition for competing successfully in an 
increasingly global and technologically advanced marketplace. For smaller firms with low core 
market shares and low levels of R&D investment, our evidence tells a different story. These fums 
retrenched during the 1980s by refocusing, divesting assets from both periperal and core 
businesses. Their refocusing appears to have been a permanent response to their reduced 




Research and development (R&D) expense, book value of assets, market value of equity, 
debt, and revenues data were obtained from the Industrial COMPUSTAT II tapes. Tobin's q 
was defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm's equity plus the. book value of its total 
debt Oong and shon term) to the book value of its total assets, following Wiles (1990). 
Data on diversification, specialization, relatedness, asset addition and divestiture rates and the 
number of establishments per firm were computed using the 1981 and 1989 TRINET Inc.'s Large 
Establishment Data Base research tapes issued in these years. The specialization ratio was computed 
by dividing the number of employees in the firm's largest 4-digit SIC code (that is, the 4-digit SIC 
code with the largest number of employees for that firm), by the number of employees for all firms 
in that 4-digit SIC code. The relatedness ratio was estimated using the same procedure at the 2-digit 
SIC code level. Establishment drop or divestiture rates were computed as the sum of employees in all 
establishments listed as being owned by a firm in 1981 which it was not listed as owning in 1989, 
divided by the total number of employees of that firm in 1981. Conversely. plant addition or 
acquisition rates were computed as the sum of employees in all establishments listed as being owned 
by a firm in 1989 which it was not listed as owning in 1981, divided by the total number of 
employees of that firm in 1989. Analysts' disagreement was computed as the five year mean of the 
monthly coefficient of variation of analysts' forecasts for earnings one year in advance. 
Table 1 
Median levels of firm focus, firm size and fraction of private firms in a sample of 3,609 firms 
which includes the largest 2500 employers in 1981 and 1989. Sales are denominated in 
millions of 1981 dollars. Change from 1981 to 1989 is measured as the percentage change in 
the medians. Statistical significance of changes is measured using a one-tailed Wilcoxon 
signed rank test. 
Variable 1981 
Number of firms 2,787 
Sales $296.7 
Employees 3,227 
Specialization Ratio 59.6% 
Relatedness Ratio 69.1% 
Span (4-digit level) 6 
Span (2-digit level) 3 
Percent Private 27.8% 
•statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
bStatistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Change from 










Median levels of focus and size and the percent of private finns among the subsamp1e of survivor 
fim1s, entering finns and exiting finns in the 1981-89 period. Sales are denominated in millions of 
1981 dollars. Change from 1981 to 1989 is measured as the percentage change in the medians. 
Statistical significance of changes is measured using a one-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
Survivor Entering Exiting 
Fim1 Finn Firm 
Variable Year Sample Sample Sample 
Sample Size 1,906 814 882 
Sales 1981 $301.1 $288.1 
1989 $414.2 $256.2 
Change an10ng survivors . 37.6%" 
Difference relative to survivors -38 .1 %" -4.3% 
Employees 1981 3.458 2,828 
1989 2,995 1,500 
Change among survivors -13.4o/c/ 
Difference relative to survivors -49.9%" -18.2%" 
Specialization Ratio 1981 58.4% 61.7% 
1989 60.4% 82.4% 
Change among survivors 3.4" 
Difference relative to survivors 36.4%" 5.7%" 
Relatedness Ratio 1981 69.1% 69.1% 
1989 76.2% 91. 7o/o. 
Change among survivors 10.3%" 
Difference relative to survivors 20.3%" 0.0% 
Span (4-digit) 1981 6 5 
1989 8 4 
Change an10ng survivors 33.3%" 
Difference relative to survivors -50.0%8 -16.7%. 
Span (2-digit) 1981 3 3 
1989 3 2 
Change an10ng survivors 0.0% 
Difference relative to survivors -33.3%" 0.0% 
Percent Private 1981 24.6% 34.6% 
1989 32.2% 55.8% 
Change among survivors 30.9%" 
Difference relative to survivors 73 .3%8 40.7%. 
•statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
bStatistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table 3 
The median rates of core and periphery establishment addition and divestiture among 1,906 
surviving members of the cohort of the 2,500 largest finns in 1981 by size decile. The 
largest fi.rms in 1981 have the lowest decile number. The core addition (divestiture) rate is 
the number of establishments added (dropped) to the firm's largest 2-digit SIC industry 
divided by the total number of establishments in 1981. The periphery addition rate is the 
number of establishments added outside of the firm's largest 2-digit SIC industry divided by 
the total number of establishments in 1981. 
Periphery Core Periphery Core 
Size Addition Addition Divestiture Divestiture 
Decile Rate(%) Rate (%) Rate(%) Rate(%) 
1 43 .8 10.3 15.6 4.0 
2 35.4 11.9 15.6 4.4 
3 28.1 19.0 18.7 6.3 
4 20.8 16.7 15.9 6.6 
5 23.0 14.3 17.9 8.3 
6 17.1 18.5 23.0 10.0 
7 17.6 18.6 17.4 8.5 
8 20.4 16.7 20.9 8.5 
9 20.7 17.4 25.5 10.1 
10 23.1 16.7 16.6 7.8 
Table 4 
Median levels of focus and size between groups which stayed public, stayed private and changed from public to private and vice-




Stayed public (N=1,235) 
1981 $375 4,433 
1989 $579 4,146 
Growth 54.4%" -6.5% 
Stayed private (N=411) 
1981 $184 1,763 
1989 $213 1,635 
Growth 15.8%b -7.3% 
Public to private (N=202) 
1981 $297 3,981 
1989 $296 2,712 
Growth -0.3% -31.9%3 
Private to public (N=57) 
1981 $241 1,942 
1989 $384 2,340 
Growth 59.3%3 20.5% 
•statisticaJJy significant at the 1 percent level. 
















Median Median Median 
Relatedness Span Span 
Ratio (4-digit) (2-digit) 
67.6% 8 3 
72.4% 10 3 
7.1%" 25.0%1 0.0% 
76.3% 4 2 
85.2% 5 2 
11.7%" 25.0%1 0.0% 
65.2% 8 3 
73.2% 7 3 
12.3%" -12.5% 0.0% 
84.7% 4 2 
84.8% 6 2 
0.1% 50.0%3 0.0% 
Table 5 
Reduced rank regressions showing the dctenninants of growth in the specialization and relatedness 
ratios among 1215 surviving publicly traded finns between 1981 and 1989. Coefficients are 
elasticities showing percentage impact of a unitary shift in an independent variable on the dependent 
variable. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
Specialization Ratio Relatedness Ratio 
I II III II III 
Tobin's q in 1981 -0.016 -0.017 -0.015 -7.3E-4 0.0013 -0.044 
(0.55) (0.58) (0.37) (0.03) (0.05) (1.10) 
Specialization/relatedness in -0.44 -0.44 -0.41 -0.45 -0.45 -0.44 
in 1981 (16 .1 )" ( 16.1 )" (11.5)" (17.0)" (17.0)3 (12.9)3 
Total book value of assets -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.076 -0.076 -0.15 
in 1981 (3. 7 3 )'' (3 .73)" (2.34)h (2.75)" (2.74)3 (3.46)" 
Core market share in 1981 -0.10 -0.09 -0.12 -0.083 -0.11 -0.06 
(3.75 )" (2 . 30)~ (3.29)" (2.99)" (2.63)" ( l. 70)c 
Upper quartile market share -10.6 25.6 
in 1981 (0.34) (0.81) 
Variability in analysts' -0.013 -0.12 
earnings forecasts in 1981 (0.24) (2.14)b 
R&D expenses/sales in 1981 -0.087 -0.087 -0.081 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 
(2.75)" (2. 75)3 (2.05)h (4.49)" (4.50)3 (3.54)3 
Intercept 1066 1063 1055 1064 1070 1161 
(27 .5)" (26.8)" (15.4)" (28.9)" (28 .3)" (17.9t 
Sample size 1215 1215 771 1215 ·1215 771 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.20 
•statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
bStatistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
.:Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table 6 
Reduced rank regressions showing the detenninants of growth in span among 1215 surviving publicly 
traded finns between 1981 and 1989. Cocfllcicnts arc elasticities showing percentage impact of a 
unitary shift in an independent variable on the dependent variable. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
4-digit span 2-digit span 
II III I II III 
Tobin's q in 1981 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.047 0.042 0.085 
(5.83)" (5.79)" (4.47)" (1.64)' (1.47) (2.10)b 
Span in 1981 -0.29 -0.29 -0.21 -0.39 -0.39 -0.40 
(9.62)' (9.61 )" (5.42)" (13.9)" (13 .9)8 (11.4)" 
Total book value of assets 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.24 
in 1981 (7.76)" (7.75)" (4.99)" (6.49)" (6.46)" (5.57)8 
Core market share in 1981 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.14 0.057 
(6.06)" (4.23)" (4.73)" (3.22)" (3.48)" (1.56)" 
Upper quartile market share -5.02 -55.8 
in 1981 (0.15) (1.76)' 
Variability of analysts' -0.044 0.039 
earnings forecasts in 1981 (0.79) (0.70) 
R&D expense/sales in 1981 0.052 0.052 0.037 0.10 . 0.10 0.14 
(1.55) ( 1.55) (0.90) (3.10)" . (3.10)" (3.61)8 
Intercept 401 400 352 591 575 505 
(12.6)" (12.1 )" (5.85)" (18 .3)" (17.2? (8.62)' 
Sample size 1215 1215 771 1215 1215 771 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.18 0.18 0.18 
•statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
bStatistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
cstatistically significant at the 10 percent.Jevel. 
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Fig. 1. Change in specialization and relatedness by 1981 size decile. 
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The figure shows percentage changes in the specialization ratio and the relatedness ratio 
between 1981 and 1989 among 1,906 surviving members of the cohort ·of the 2,500 largest 
fmns in 1981. The largest firms in 1981 have the lowest decile number. Each decile 
represents 190 firms. 
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Fig. 2. Change in focus by 1981 focus decile. 
The figure shows changes in specialization and relatedness among 1,906 surviving members 
of the cohort of the 2,500 largest firms in 1981. The firms with the highest specialization 
ratio in 1981 have the lowest decile number. 
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Fig. 3. Change in aggregate scope of internal capital markets. 
The figure shows the share of aggregate revenues of all surviving firm$ with above median 
focus in 1981 and 1989. These firms had a related ratio greater than 69.1% (the 1981 median 
value). 
In 1981 952 fmns had a relatedness ratio more than the median of 69.1% with total sales 
revenues of $1.21 trillion. There were 953 firms with a relatedness ratio less than 69.1% 
with sales revenues of $1.55 trillion. By 1989, 811 fmns had a relatedness ratio less than 
69.1% with total revenues of $1.68 trillion, and 1,094 fmns had a relatedness ratio greater 
than 69.1% with total revenues of $1.12 trillion. Sales revenues are denominated in 1981 
dollars. 
REFERENCES 
Amihud, Yakov and Baruch Lev, 1981, Risk reduction as a managerial motive for 
conglomerate mergers, Bell Journal of Economics 12, 605-617. 
Bhagat, Sanjai, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1990. The aftermath of hostile 
takeovers. In George Perry (ed.), Brookings Papers on Economics: Microeconomics. 
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 
Bhide, Amir, 1990, Reversing corporate diversification, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 
5, 70-81. 
Bicksler, James L. and Andrew H. Chen, 1991, The economics of corporate restructuring: An 
overview. In Arnold W. Sametz (ed.), The battle for corporate control, Irwin, IL. 
Comment, Robert and Gregg A. Jarrell, 1992, Corporate focus, stock returns and the market 
for corporate control, Working Paper, MERC, University of Rochester. 
Gort, Michael, 1962, Diversification and integration in American indust1y, Princeton 
Univeristy Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Gort, Michael, Henry Grabowski and Robert McGuckin, 1985, Organizatic;mal capital and the 
choice between specialization and diversification, Managerial and Decision Economics 
6, 2-9. 
Hill, Charles W. L. and Gary S. Hansen, 1991, A longitudinal study of the cause and 
consequences of changes in diversification in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, 1977-
1986, Strategic Management Journal 12, 187-200. · 
Hill, Charles W. L. and Scott Snell, 1988, external control, corporate strategy and firm 
performance in research-intensive industries, Strategic Management Journal 9, 577-
590. 
Hoskisson, Robert E. and Richard A. Johnson, 1991, Corporate restructuring and strategic 
change: The effect on diversification strategy and R&D intensity, manuscript, Texas 
A&M University. 
Iman, R. L. and W. J. Conover, 1979, The use of the rank transform in regression, 
Technometrics 21, 499-509. 
Jensen, Michael C., 1991, Corporate control and the politics of finance, Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 6, 13-33. 
Jensen, Michael C., 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers, 
American Economic Review 76, 323-329. 
Kaplan, Steven N. and Michael S. Weisbach, 1992, The success of acquisitions: Evidence 
from divestitures, Journal of Finance 57, 107-138. 
Kravis, Irving B. and Robert E. Lipsey, 1992, Sources of competitiveness of the United States 
and of its multinational finns, Review of Economics and Statistics 74, 193-201. 
Lang, Larry and Robert Litzenberger, 1989, Dividend announcements: Cash flow signalling 
vs. free cash flow hypothesis?, Journal of Financial Economics 24, 181-192. 
Lang, Larry and Rene Stulz, 1992, Does diversification create value?, manuscript, New York 
University. 
Lang, Larry, Rene Stulz and Ralph Walkling, 1991, A test of the free cash flow hypothesis: 
The case of bidder returns, Journal of Financial Economics 28, 315-335. 
LeBaron, D. and Laurence. S. Speidell, 1987, Why are the parts worth more than the sum? 
'Chop shop,' A corporate valuation model. In Lynne E. Browne and Eric. S. 
Rosengren (Eds.), The Merger Boom. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, MA. 
Lichtenberg, Frank, 1992, Industrial de-diversification and its consequences for productivity, 
forthcoming, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 
Liebeskind, Julia, Margarethe Weirsema and Gary Hansen, 1992, LBOs, corporate 
restructuring and the incentive-intensity hypothesis, Financial Management 21, 73-88. 
Mar.kides, Constantinos, 1992, Consequences of corporate restructuring: Ex ante evidence, 
Academy of Management Journal 35, 398-412. 
Marris, Robin, 1964. The Economic The01y of Managerial Capitalism, Free Press, Glencoe, 
IL. 
Matsusaka, John, 1990, Takeover motives during the conglomerate takeover wave, 
manuscript, University of Chicago. 
Mitchell, Mark and Kenneth Lehn, 1990, Do bad bidders make good targets?, Journal of 
Political Economy 98, 372-398. 
Morek, Randall, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1990, Do managerial objectives drive 
bad acquisitions?, Journal of Finance 45, 31-48. 
Neumark, David and Steven A. Sharpe, 1992, Hostile takeovers and expropriation of 
extramarginal wages: A test, Finance and Economics Discussion Series Paper 197, 
Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC. 
Opler, Tim C., 1992, Hostile takeovers and intangible resources: An empirical investigation, 
Working Paper 92-041, E. L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, 
Dallas, TX. 
Opler, Tim C. and Sheridan Titman, 1992, The determinants of LBO activity: Free cash flow 
vs. fmancial distress costs, Working Paper 92-031, E. L. Cox School of Business, 
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX. 
Palepu, Krishna, 1985, Diversification strategy, profit performance and the entropy measure. 
Strategic Management Journal 6, 239-255. 
Roll, Richard, 1986, The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers, Journal of Busienss 59, 
197-216. 
Rumelt, Richard P., 1986, Strategy, structure and economic pelformance (Second Edition), 
Harvard University Press. 
Singh, Harbir and Sea Jin Chang, 1992, Corporate reconfiguration: A resource perspective, 
Manuscript, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, PA. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, 1991, Takeovers in the '60s and the '80s: Evidence 
and implications, Strategic Management Journal 12, 51-60. 
Spruill, Charles R., 1982, Conglomerates and the growth of capitalism, Southern Illinois 
Press, Carbondale, IL. 
Stein, Jeremy, 1989, Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate 
behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics 54, 655-669. 
Teece, David J., 1980, Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 1, 223-247. 
Wernerfelt, Birger and Cynthia Montgomery, 1988, Tobin's q and the important of focus in 
finn perfonnance, American Economic Review 78, 246-250. 
Wiles, Kenneth, 1990, Alternative constructions of Tobin's q: An empirical comparison, 
manuscript, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC. 
Williamson, Oliver, 1975, Markets and Hierarchies (Free Press, New York, NY). 
Note: The following is a partial list of papers that are 
currently available in the Edwin L. Cox School of 
Business Working Paper Series. When requesting a 
paper, please include the Working Paper number as 
well as the title and author(s), and enclose pay-
ment of $2.50 per copy made payable to SMU. A 
complete list is available upon request from: 
Business Information Center 
Edwin L. Cox School of Business 
Southern Methodist University 















"Organizational Subcultures in a Soft Bureaucracy: 
Resistance Behind the Myth and Facade of an 
Official Culture," by John M. Jermier, John W. 
Slocum, Jr., Louis W. Fry, and Jeannie Gaines 
"Global Strategy and Reward Systems: The Key 
Roles of Management Development and Corporate 
Culture," by David Lei, John w. Slocum, Jr., and 
Robert w. Slater 
"Multiple Niche Competition - The Strategic Use of 
CIM Technology," by David Lei and Joel D. Goldhar 
"Global Strategic Alliances," by David Lei and 
John W. Slocum, Jr. 
"A Theoretical Model of Household Coupon Usage 
Behavior And Empirical Test," by Ambuj Jain and 
Arun K. Jain 
"Household's Coupon Usage Behavior: Influence 
of In-Store Search," by Arun K. Jain and Ambuj 
Jain 
"Organization Designs for Global Strategic Alli-
ances," by John W. Slocum, Jr. and David Lei 
"Option-like Properties of Organizational Claims: 
Tracing the Process of Multinational Exploration," 
by Dileep Hurry 
"A Review of the Use and Effects of Comparative 
Advertising," by Thomas E. Barry 
"Global Expansion and the Acquisition Option: The 
Process of Japanese Takeover Strategy in the 
United States," by Dileep Hurry 
"Designing Global Strategic Alliances: Inte-
gration of Cultural and Economic Factors," by 
John W. Slocum, Jr. and David Lei 
"The Components of the Change in Reserve Value: 
New Evidence on SFAS No. 69," by Mimi L. Alciatore 
"Asset Returns, Volatility and the Output Side," 
by G. Sharathchandra 
"Pursuing Product Modifications and New Products: 
The Role of Organizational Control Mechanisms in 
Implementing Innovational Strategies in the 















"Management Practices in Learning Organizations," 
by Michael McGill, John W. Slocum, Jr., and David 
Lei 
"The Determinants of LBO Activity: Free Cash 
Flow Vs. Financial Distress Costs," by Tim Opler 
"A Model of Supplier Responses to Just-In-Time 
Delivery Requirements," by John R. Grout and 
David P. Christy 
"An Inventory Model of Incentives for On-Time 
Delivery in Just-In-Time Purchasing Contracts," 
by John R. Grout and David P. Christy 
"The Effect of Early Resolution of Uncertainty on 
Asset Prices: A Dichotomy into Market and Non-
Market Information," by G. Sharathchandra and Rex 
Thompson 
"Conditional Tests of a Signalling Hypothesis: 
The Case of Fixed Versus Adjustable Rate Debt," 
by Jose Guedes and Rex Thompson 
"Tax-Loss-Selling and Closed-End Stock Funds," by 
John W. Peavy III 
"Hostile Takeovers and Intangible Resources: An 
Empirical Investigation," by Tim C. Opler 
"Morality and Models," by Richard 0. Mason 
"Global Outsourcing of Information Processing 
Services," by Uday M. Apte and Richard 0. Mason 
"Improving Claims Operations: A Model-Based 
Approach," by Uday M. Apte, Richard A. Cavaliere, 
and G. G. Hegde 
"Corporate Restructuring and The Consolidation of 
U.S. Industry," by Julia Liebeskind, Timothy C. 
Opler, and Donald E. Hatfield 
"Catalog Forecasting System: A Graphics-Based 
Decision Support System," by David V. Evans and 
Uday M. Apte 
"Interest Rate Swaps: A Bargaining Game 
Solution," by Uday Apte and Prafulla G. Nabar 
